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ABSTRACT
The accepted and taught doctrine of public debt theory has been
that the burden of public debt is borne by those persons present at the
ti^e of deficit expenditure. In 1958 a book, Public Principles of Public
Debt
,
by Professor J. M. Buchanan, challenged this proposition by
asserting that the public debt burden was borne by those persons present
at the time the debt was redeemed.
The purpose of this stud;/ has been to examine those arguments set
forth by Professor Buchanan and others, both for and against, in an






I The Problem 1






The theory of public debt burden has, in general,
most economists agreeing on the basic concepts. However,
in 1958 a new book appeared on the scene which was to
have significant consequences on the subject. The
following words of Professor Gordon Tullock summarize
the situation:
In 195>8> Professor James Buchanan published a
book contending that almost all economists had been
wrong and that President Eisenhower was fundamentally
right. The startling nature of this thesis, together
with the cogency of the arguments offered for it
created a small crisis for many economists. The idea
that the common man was more sophisticated on a rather
important point than the economics profession was not
only intellectually, but emotionally disturbing. The
consequence has been a continuing debate in which a
group of young "radicals" defending Buchanan have
b^en opposed by older and more conservative scholars
in the field of public finance. The debate has
surely generated more heat than light, but it has served
to illuminate a number of dark corners.
1
Those precepts under attack are best set forth by
A. P. Lerner in his paper, "The Burden of the National
Debt," as quoted by Buchanan. The following excerpts will
suffice:
"-Gordon Tullock, "Public Debt-Who Bears The Burden?,"
Rivista di diritto finanziario e scienza della finanze , XXII
(June, I963), pp. 207-13. Reprinted in James M. Ferguson
(ed.) Public Debt and Future Generations
. (Chapel Hill:
The University of North Carolina Press, 196)4), p. 101.

'By far the most common concern about the national
debt comes from considering it as exactly the same
kind of thing as a private debt which one individual
owes to others. • . . (p. 255)
The simple transferability of this rule to
national debt is denied by nearly all economists. ...
(p. 255)
One of the most effective ways of clearing up
this most serious of all semantic confusions is to
point out that private debt differs from national
debt in being external . It is owed by one person
to others . That is what makes it burdensome.
Because it is interpersonal the proper analogy is
not to national debt but to internatf onal debt. ...
But this does not hold for national debt which is
owed by the nation to citizens of the same nation.
There is no external creditor. "We owe it to our-
selves." .... (p. 256)
One variant of the false analogy is the declaration
that national debt puts an unfair burden on our
children, who are thereby made to pay for our
extravagences. Very few economists need to be
reminded that if our children or grandchildren repay
some of the national debt these payments will be
made to our children and grandchildren and to nobody
else .... (p. 256)
>
2
A further perusal of almost any modern work on the
subject would give you the same approach. Ferguson puts
it thus: "
Most economists in recent decades have agreed that
society as a whole composed of a fixed population
bears no burden in future periods of any public
expenditure financed internally by public debt (or
taxes) which occurs in the current period. The real
cost or burden of the project is the real resources
withdrawn from the private sectors in the period of
the expenditure. There is no way that debt financing
enables real resources to be transferred from the
future to the present. Some citizens in future
periods may pay taxes and some receive interest pay-
James M. Buchanan, Public Principles of Public
Debt (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1958),
p. 12.

ments but these are transfer payments involving no
real burden, because no real resources are used up
in the process.
3
And Meade writes the following on the internal-external
debt subject:
It is well known that an external debt is a
burden on a community, since there must be a transfer
of real goods and services from the debtor to the
creditor country in payment of interest and sinking
fund on the debt. A domestic debt, on the other hand,
means merely a transfer from citizens as taxpayers
to citizens as property-owners, so that there is no
direct loss of real goods and services to the citizens
as a whole. li
And on the general subject Buchanan indicates:
... the ideas central to the new orthodoxy are
indeed old ones. They have been fully recognized in
nearly all pre-Keynesian fiscal theory discussion. .
Since the previous quotations are somewhat broad in
scope the subject of this study shall be emphasized
specifically as an examination of the transferability of
the public debt burden , the basic question being who is
correct, Professor Lerner and the more conservative
economists or Professor Buchanan and his group of young
liberal economists? As a foundation for the ensuing
argument, the precepts, previously quoted above, of Lerner,
3james M. Ferguson, "introduction," Public Debt and
Future Generations
, p. 3.
^-James E. Meade, "Is the National Debt a Burden,"
Oxford Economic Papers , X (June, 1958), pp. 163-83.




. , p. 19.

Ferguson and M^ade shall be assumed to represent the most
generally accepted, and taught, doctrine.
Associated with this particular subject, although
of no concern to this study, is a very definite attitude
on the part of the voter and the policy maker in the
establishment of monetary and fiscal policy so important
to the nation's economy. Unfortunately, the average
individual and many elected representatives consider the
burden of public debt, as well as the public debt itself,
to be very germane to fiscal policy. However, it is most
generally agreed among economists that the subject under
debate should have very little, if any, bearing upon
fiscal policy. Professor Mishan very strongly criticizes
Buchanan and supporters for even raising the issue in fear
of the possible political ramifications.
One other significant problem, as put by Buchanan,
is that, ".
. . clarity is not one of the characteristic
features of the literature in this field."''
7
An effort will
be made to present the various arguments in such a manner
as to clarify.
Since much of the argument is basicall;/- concerned
with semantics only those terms having clear and un-
6E. J. Mishan, "How to Make a Burden of the Public




. , p. Lj.8.

contested meanings will be defined. Public debt is
defined to be that portion of internally financed public
debt issued by the federal government. Such a debt is
oftentimes referred to as national debt. Internal debt
is that share of the public debt which is held by citizens
of the debtor nation. External debt would be that portion
of the public debt held by persons, organizations, or
governments foreign to the debtor community, state, or
nation. Unless otherwise specifically stated all refer-
ence to public debt in this paper will be on the
assumption that the entire public debt is internal debt.
Pull employment of the economy is defined in the true
economic sense to include full employment of all resources.
This study was conducted within the bounds of the
material offered at the U. S. Naval Postgraduate School
Library. An effort was made to review all the arguments
which have transpired as an outgrowth of Professor
Buchanan's Public Principles of Public Debt . A review of
all the leading economic journals available at the library
was made in an effort to obtain the material in its
original source. In some cases where this material was
not available, Public Debt and Future Generations , edited
by James M. Ferguson, was utilized. This publication
contains a complete reprint of almost all of the
pertinent articles.
The time span of this study covers the period 1958
$






The procedure to be employed in this study shall,
as much as possible, be a chronological examination of
the most significant arguments on the subject. The
fundamental concepts generally accepted by the majority
of economists, as presented in Chapter I, will be assumed
as the standard. It will, therefore, be the purpose of
this chapter to begin examination with the conflicting
arguments set forth by Professor J. M. Buchanan in Public
Principles of Public Debt . Following this will be
pertinent arguments complementing or refuting the
Buchanan propositions.
The basic argument to be investigated pertains to
the placing of the public debt burden on a specific
generation. As noted previously, the accepted doctrine
states that the burden of internally financed public
debt is borne at the time of public expenditure. The
burden is defined to be the sacrifice associated with
the withdrawing of resources from private consumption
and the investment of these resources for public expend-
iture. Such a public expenditure would be for the
betterment of the community as a whole, and would be
weighed against alternative uses of the resources, either
public or private. Buchanan disagrees with this doctrine

and puts forth the following arguments to support his
argument.
Buchanan argued that "The mere shifting of resources
from private to public employment does not carry with it
any implication of sacrifice or payment."" His reasoning
was that the purchase of government bonds is a voluntary
act of the individual and by such a purchase the individual
is presumably moving to a more preferred position on his
utility surface. Then, if this is true, obviously the
individual is not making any apparent sacrifice or burden.
Therefore, if there is no individual sacrifice there can
be no collective sacrifice for the nation as a whole.
°
In keeping with his hypothesis that the reverse was
true, i.e., the burden of debt is shifted into future
periods, Buchanan stated that, "if we can isolate the group
itfho will be x-^orse off ... we shall have located the bearers
of the primary real burden of the debt." 10 Since the
taxpayer at the time of debt creation bore no burden, the
burden must rost with the taxpayer who is present when the
debt is redeemed. This burden is defined as the resources
given up to retire the debt. To refute any possible argu-
ment that the public expenditure might be productive and
result in benefits to the future taxpayer Buchanan acknow-
ledged the following:
Buchanan, op_. clt .
, p. 3I4.. 9Ibid. , p. 35. 10 Ibid. , p. 1|0

. . .
the benefits to the future taxpa;/er must, of
course, be compared with the burden so that, on balance,
he may suffer a net burden. But a normal procedure is
to separate the two sides of the account and to oppose
a burden against a benefit, and this future taxpayer
is the only one to whom such a burden may be
attributed.il
In the final point of his argument with the "new
orthodoxy", on this subject, Buchanan took issue with
".
. .
the careless use of national income accounting. . "
He contends that the error is in focusing attention "on the
national or community balance sheet rather than on individual
or family balance sheets."! Because of this error there
is no net change to the aggregate totals making up the
national balance since it contains both the bondholders
and the taxpayers. He continues that:
"... the nation or community is not a sentient
being, and decisions are not made in any super
individual or organic way. Individuals and families
are the entities whose balance sheets must be examined
if the effects on social decisions are to be
determined. "13
In the conclusion to his argument, Buchanan emphasized
the following:
. . .
The primary real burden of a public debt
does rest largely with future generations, and that
creation of debt does involve the shifting of the
burden to individuals living in time periods sub-
sequent to that of debt issue. This conclusion is
diametrically opposed to the fundamental principles










In view of the literature that followed, very f ew
economists accepted his analysis in to to . Although
many of the more liberal economists were to accept his
general proposition, they did so only after making
certain refinements. These comments, however, were to
follow some very critical and opposing book reviews.
The following reviews indicate the initial impact of the
argument upon the more conservative economists.
In one of the early book reviews of Professor
Buchanan's book, Alvin H. Hansen in the Review of Economics
and Statistics argued that:
. • . Professor Buchanan appears to exclude
altogether the matter of real sacrifice - harder
work and restricted consumption - and to limit
himself to exclusively the financial considerations.
It is, however, the real factors that are important:
in particular the impact of the borrowing upon the
real income and real assets of future generations. 15
In still another review, Professor A. P. Lerner
asserts that Buchanan is not disputing the "new orthodoxy"
view:
. . .
that a closed society cannot shift any
burden from the present into the future by
borrowing money for itself but what he is really
showing is that it is possible by borrowing instead
of taxing to make the public at-large feel richer
.
. . thus inducing it to consume more, so that less




^Alvin H. Hansen, ( Review of Public Principles of
Debt), "The Public Debt Reconsidered," The Review of
Economics and Statistics
, XLI (June, 1959) , p. 3?8.
10

future generations. But the artificiality of
saying that it la the debt that constitutes this
shift of burden from the present to future
generations can be brought out by noting that
this burden would in no way be mitigated by the
repudiation of the debt at any time in the
future. The New Orthodoxist would merely say
that investment enriches future generations, and
anything that reduces investment or induces dis-
investment puts this kind of burden on the future.
He would deal with such effects of debt or of
borrowing under the heading of indirect or
secondary effects. . . .1°
In a later review of this same book, Earl R. Rolph
indicated that he failed to find the meaning of the
phrase "primary real burden of the public debt" which
was so fundamental to the analysis. He further pointed
out that "no firm principle emerges from the discussion. "1?
Rolph' s concluding comments were that:
Buchanan has provided a stimulating work
calling for a re-examination of fundamental ideas
in economics. Its success will depend upon the
:
amount of controversy it provokes; it is so
designed. 18
After a rather harsh reception by the "new orthodoxy"
of Buchanan's views a number of younger less conservative
economists climbed on the Buchanan bandwagon. This group
was later to be labeled the "new heretics" by Professor
XDAbba P. Lerner, ( Review of Public Principles of
Public Debt ) , The Journal of Political Economy , XLVII
(April,I9F9), pp. 205-6.
1
^E. R. Rolph, ( Review of Public Principles of





Mishan.19 Prominent among the "new heretics" was
Professor Franco Modigliani of Northwestern University
and a group consisting of William G. Bowen, Richard G.
Davis, and David H. Kopf from the Bconomics Department of
Princeton University.
The first published essay in support of Buchanan
was by Bowen, Davis, and Kopf. Their following comments
summarize their intentions:
J. M. Buchanan is one of the few contemporary
economists to argue in favor of the proposition that
the real burden of a public debt can be shifted to
future generations. It was Buchanan's stimulating
book that started the train of thought that has
resulted in the argument contained in this paper.
The reason for the present paper is that while
Buchanan has arrived at essentially the same
conclusion, he has apparently not succeeded in
convincing very many people that he is right - at
any rate he has not convinced several reviewers of
his book. Perhaps the reason these reviewers have
not accepted Buchanan's conclusion on this point is
that Buchanan: (1) does not always define "real
burden" in a sufficiently clear manner; (2) defines
"generation" in such a manner that the same person
can be considered a member of many different
generations; and (3) relies on what Rolph has
called a proof by indirection". We have tried to
avoid these pitfalls. 20
BDK first proceed to redefine real burden after
first acknowledging that if one accepts the standard
definition (i.e. "... the total amount of private con-
sumption goods given up by the community at the moment
^Misham, ojd. cit
. , p. 530.
on,
^William G. Bowen, et. al., "The Public Debt: A
Burden on Future Genera tions, """""The American Economic
Review




of time borrowed funds are spent ") ". . . the cost of
the public project simply must be borne by the generations
alive at the time the borrowing occurs." 21 It was their
contention that real burden could be defined in such a
way as to permit a shifting of the debt burden to future
generations. They were to define:
. . .
the real burden of a public debt to a generation
as the total consumption of private goods foregone
during the lifetime of the generation as a conse-
quence of government borrowing and attendant public
spending. 22
They were next to assume a full-employment model
made up of ".
. .
an identifiable generation of people,
all of whom are ... 21 years old. 3 it was further
assumed that this same generation, to be labeled
"Generation I", would purchase all the bonds necessary
to finance a specific government expenditure.
"Generation I" was to hold the bonds for l\l\. years,
at which time they would sell to "Generation II", all of
whom were 21 years of age. All the funds received from
the sale, by "Generation I" were to be spent prior to
their death, the point being that there had been no change
in their total lifetime consumption.
If Generation II were to sell to Generation III, etc,
in which case as long as none of the bonds were retired
no generation would bear a burden. However, if some
21 Ibid.
, pp. 701-2. 22Ibid. , p. 702. 23Ibid,
13

generation were to retire some or all the bonds that
particular generation would experience a reduction to
total lifetime consumption and consequently bear a
burden. Thus, indicating that the burden had been shifted
forward to a future generation. 4-
Although BDK continued in their essay to elaborate
with the same general analysis no further significant
contribution to the Buchanan proposition was made.
However, a few months later three commenting articles
were to appear, still in support of the Buchanan hypothesis,
but offering constructive criticism to the BDK approach.
In the first of these articles, William Vickrey
agreed they were right, but suggested that their approach




He asserted that their model might apply during a
situation similar to that of World War II, but that it
would be inappropriate in an economy of free and expanding
consumption. Vickrey argued that the Bowen-David-Kopf
assumption provides for a reduction in private consumption
at the time of the debt-financed project and is contrary





2^^William Vickrey, "The Burden of the Public Debt:




Only if savings were highly interest-elastic
and investment highly inelastic, or if the project
financed were specifically such as to substitute
directly for consumption expenditure could it be
assumed that the resources used would be derived
from a reduction in private consumption.
The shifting of the burden to the future that
is produced by debt financing is then essentially
the shifting of resources out of private investment
and into consumption that is induced by the change
in method financing.
In the Bowen-Davis-Kopf representation, where
the resources required by the project come from
consumption, the productive capacity of the economy
is unimpaired ... If there is any burden here, it
lies in the impairment of the capacity of the future
to pull this stunt thems elves.v ... In any case,
there exists an unavoidable "real" burden on future
generations whenever the more tangible resources
available to the future generations are impaired. 26
Tibor Scitovsky was next to attack the Bowen-Davis-
Kopf approach. Scitovsky indicated that they "... had
failed to prove
. . .
the majority of professional
economists wrong.
. .
."27 He did agree, however, with
an argument initially introduced by Buchanan which they
had also included in their essay. The argument being
that if the government debt-financed project proved to
be unproductive and failed to raise G-NP a burden would
be imposed. His major point of disagreement with the
BDK analysis is as follows:
26 Ibid.
, p. 13i|.
2 ?Tibor Scitovsky, "The Burden of the Public Debt:





I part company with the authors when they
speak of yet another burden imposed by and at the
time of redemption of the bonds. They argue that
when the government repays the debt, the additional
taxation reduces disposable income and hence
consumption, while the replacement of the public's
holdings of bonds by cash has little or no effect
on its market behavior, so that on balance con-
sumption is reduced, which, they assert, is the
main burden of the debt. This would be all right,
except that the authors forget about the crucial
assumptions of full employment they made earlier.
If full employment and stable prices obtain when
the debt falls due for redemption and an unen-
lightened government raises taxes (or lowers public
spending) in order to create the budgetary surplus
needed to redeem the debt, then the redemption will
lower GNP and inflict a burden on society - but the
assumption of full employment has thus been abandoned
half-way. If on the other hand the government
successfully offsets the restrictive effects of its
budgetary surplus by a monetary policy designed
to encourage private investment, then the resulting
rise in GN^ will offset the effect of higher taxes
on disposable income and no burden will be imposed
on the public. 28
In reply to the comments of Vickrey and Scitovsky,
Bowen, Davis, and Kopf hold their original position.
They contend that Vickrey' s paper in reality "...
complements - rather than competes with ..." their
position. And while acknowledging their error In full-
employment analysis, indicated by Scitovsky, still contend
that this has no effect on their analysis because of the
lifetime total consumption definition of real burden. °
28 Ibid
., p. 138
29William G. Bowen, e_t. al
.
, "The Burden of Public




Professor A. p. Lerner was soon back in the thick
of the argument. In a paper commenting on the BDK
position Lerner strongly admonished BDK (and Buchanan)
for playing linguistic tricks. He agrees that with the
assumptions and definitions employed by BDK the burden
would be shifted from this generation to the next
generation. However, he denies that this analysis is
germane to the question of debt burden. 30 Lerner
argues that:
The real issue ... is not whether it is
possible to shift a burden (either in the present
or in the future) from some people to other people,
but whether it is possible by internal borrowing to
shift a real burden from the present generation, in
the sense of the present economy as a whole, onto a
a future generation, in the sense of the future
economy as a whole.
. . .
(and) that the latter is
impossible because a project that uses up resources
needs resources at the time that it uses them up
,
and not before or after.
This basic proposition is true of all projects
that use up resources. The question is traditionally
posed in terms of the burden of a public project
financed by privately held internal debt; but the
proposition is auite independent of whether the
project is public or private as well as whether
the debt is private or public. The proposition
holds as long as the project is financed internally
,
so that there are no outsiders to take over the
current burden by providing the resources and to
hand back the burden in the future by asking for
the return of the resources. 31
The fallacy in composition accusation arises again
3°Abba p. Lerner, "The Burden of Debt," The Review
of Economics and Statistics , XLII (May, 1961) . Reprinted







against the "new heretics" as Lerner continues in
support of the above quoted proposition.
It is necessary for economists to keep repeating
this basic proposition because one of their main
duties is to keep warning the people against the
fallacy of composition. To anyone who sees only a
part of the economy it does seem possible to borrow
from the future because he assumes that what is
true of the part is true of the whole. 32
In reply to the preceding comments of Lerner, BDK
were again quite adamant in their contention that the
issue involved was not "a Terminological dispute". 33
However, since their initial model of "Generation I, II,
etc. had drawn so much criticism they found it necessary
to devise a new model "to try to remove any vestiges of
semantic confusion". In this model those individuals
alive at time t Q would be referred to as "Set I". The
set would be called the same but through the process
of births and deaths its composition would change. 34-
The argument was to continue in basically the same vein
as the original "Generation I" model.
It is interesting to note the great similarity of
this "Set I" model and the original Buchanan model.
More interesting yet, is the fact that the initial
32Ibid.
33v/illiam G. Bowen, e_t. al
.
, "The Distribution of the
Debt Burden: A Reply," The Review of Economics and Statistics
,
XLIV (February, 1962). Reprinted in James M. Ferguson (ed.),






Bowen, e_t al, model was devised in an effort to overcome
the inadequacies of the original Buchanan model.
In concluding their reply to Lerner, BDK continued
noting the following differences of opinions:
In our analysis it is individuals, with their
claims against consumption goods, who move through
time, not real resources. Our analysis is concerned
with the effects of debt finance on the distribution
of life-time consumption between persons alive at the
time the borrowing occurred and persons yet to come,
not on the level of output of the economy as a whole
at different points in time.
Lerner, on the other hand, seems unwilling to
speak of the "burden of the debt" in terms of any
measure other than induced changes in the level of
national income. This is the way in which economists
have become accustomed to defining the burden of the
debt, it is one useful way of looking at the effects
of debt finance, and we of course agree with Lerner
that debt-financing produces a burden in this sense
only if there are effects of the investment-
consumption mix. 35
Hans Neisser was one of the next to appear in support
of the "new heretics". Although agreeing with the basic
concepts of BDK, he contended that his model would provide
a "simpler refutation of the new orthodoxy", 3° and at the
same time
. . .
"clarify certain points not touched on"37
previously. Neisser is concerned with the real capital














deficit financing places a burden on future generations by
reducing the amount of real capital available to them.
The Neisser analysis is based on the assumption that
the funds to finance deficit expenditure come almost
entirely from funds that would have been available for
private capital expenditure. This, as opposed to the case
of tax financing for the public expenditure, where funds
would come in part from a reduction in private consumption
and in part from a reduction in private capital expenditure.
The argument is that in the deficit situation the stock of
real capital available would be less to a future generation
than if the expenditure had been financed by taxation.
Neisser is first to admit, however, that:
This principle, however, holds only ivhen the
condition of full utilization is satisfied. When
it is not there are two situations in which
government borrowing does not imply a burden on
the future. First, if the inducement to invest is
inelastic, private investment may fall short of the
saving potential, even at the lowest possible
interest rate, and thus government borrowing would
not reduce private investment.
. . .
And second, if
current private investment, though equal to the saving
potential, is so high that a further appropriate
increase
. . .
cannot be expected, and that therefore
underutilization is likely in subsequent periods,
current government borrowing will not reduce future
income and consumption. 3®
Jack Wiseman, a Britisher, was one of the next
individuals to join in the fray. Wiseman attributed the





orthodoxy". He also stated that:
. . .
the "burden propositions, as formulated by
classical writers and by supporters of the "new
orthodoxy" are so vague as to defy precise inter-
pretation. This is done to the persistence, in
debt discussion, of general statements about burden
which obscure the diversity of the relevant economic
considerations.
... In general the approach in the "burden"
discussion has been on a "partial equilibrium" kind,
in that it has been assumed that it is possible to
compare the situation of a community with a public
debt and that of one in which debt does not exist




to be realistic and useful, discussion of
debt policy must distinguish between the raising and
the spending of money by the government, and must
consider the raising of debt in relation to other




In concluding, Wiseman suggested that the entire
argument of debt burden be considered pointless, and that
economists could better utilize their time in "the study
of particular situations in which the raising or retire-
ment of debt is one of the possible means of pursuing a
specified objective. "40
One of the most novel models submitted in support
of the "new heretics" was introduced by Gordon Tullock.
In this model the government was to come into possession
(free) of a gold producing machine. There was no operating
™ Jack Wiseman, "The Logic of National Debt Policy,"
Westminster Bank Review (August, 1961) . Reprinted in
James M. Ferguson (ed.), Public Debt and Future Generations,
p. 180.
ko Ibid., p. 181.
21

cost, etc. associated with the machine, hoi^ever, each
gold bar produced must be returned to the machine twenty
years hence.
By further elaboration for convenience of the
purchaser of the gold bar, the government issued only
warehouse receipts (in effect, bonds) and paid a storage
fee (in effect, interest) on the gold in the warehouse.
Obviously, since the purchaser does so voluntarily
he cannot be assumed to be burdened. However, when the
government must raise taxes to buy the warehouse receipts
back to return the gold to the machine, the taxpayer or
"future generation" is making some sacrifice. The real
clincher for this argument is when another free machine
appears at the end of 18 years that tells the first
machine that it doesn't need to get it's gold back. The
point being that the entire burden of the original ex-
penditure would thus disappear. If the burden is borne
by the gold (bond) redeemer (taxpayer) there is no problem
since this is two years hence. But if the burden were
borne at the time the gold was sold then the burden would
be "eliminated retroactively, which is absurdi'^--'-
Still another writer in support of the "new heretics"
came forward with an elaboration of an approach previously
used by Vickrey. This writer, H. Laurence Miller, Jr.,
assumes a situation where the community has financed a
^Tullock, op_. c i
t
. , p. 106.
22

a public project of long term benefits, to all members of
the community, by public debt. The assumption, of the
community, being that in this way future members of the
community will therefore also be required to bear part
of the burden. It also follows that the members of the
present community suffer no burden in the sense of a
reduction in utility. They have just moved from one to
a more preferable level on their utility plane. And
since in addition no one has paid any taxes, Miller
continues, "a tax burden in the form of a compulsory
reduction in consumption opportunities is shifted into
the future."^" At this point there appears to be little
if any difference between this analysis and the analysis
of Bowen-David-Kopf
.
Miller, however, differs from Bowen-Davis-Kopf as
he continues:
We have been assuming that all members of the
community are supporting this action with full
knowledge that a tax liability is being shifted to
the future, that they expect a tax in the future if
they receive a benefit, and that they know that the
only reason for not levying the full cost of the
public investment in taxes is . . • inability to
assign future benefits to present persons in this
situation, the probability of a future tax equals
the probability of a future benefit for every
member of the community, and "shifting the burden"
refers to exchanging a certain reduction in
" H. Laurence Miller, Jr. , "Anticipated and Unan-
ticipated Consequences of Public Debt Creation," Economica
,
XXIX (november, 1962) . Reprinted in James M. Ferguson




consumption now (or later, if the individual can
borrow to pay taxes) for some probability less than
one of a reduction in consumption (offset by receipt
of a benefit) later.
In summary, we have said that public borrowing
plus spending can shift a burden from the present to
the future where everyone understands what the govern-
ment is doing, and has no hope whatsoever of pushing
taxes off on to others, in the sense that each
individual exchanges a certain reduction in consump-
tion for a less certain reduction in consumption. k3
Miller further asserts that his analysis is valid
regardless of the outcome of the public investment on
private capital investment. 44
Carl S. Shoup was next to contribute a paper
commenting on the Buchanan hypothesis and the Bowen-
Davis-Kopf analysis. Shoup agreed to some extent with
Lerner that neither had any argument with the accepted
doctrine. Shoup stated:
It is not the simple argument that since
resources are used up at the time of government
expenditure, the generation living at the time of
expenditure itfill bear the burden. What the new
analyses are opposing, or by-passing as unimpor-
tant or irrelevant, or supplementing, is the more
sophisticated view that the burden can be passed
on to future generations, but only in so far as
the present generation responds to the Government's
action by reducing its rate of savings.
Now the less the first generation decreases its
consumption, the smaller is the capital stock handed
down to the second generation. In this sense, and
only in this sense
. . .
can financing by bonds lay





. , p. 168.
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financing by taxes. The burden consists of
inheriting a smaller stock of capital instruments
than otherwise.M-5
Shoup commented as follows on the BDK argument that
Generation II would bear the burden if it retired the Debt:
This thesis may at first appear to run counter
to the older analysis, which asserted that a future
generation could be burdened only if its patrimony
were impaired by the generation during whose life-
time the government expenditure was incurred. Under
the BDK scheme ... Generation II and the following
possess just as much capital equipment as they would
have possessed if no government expenditure and
financing had occurred; yet BDK conclude that they
are bearing part of the burden.
If we look at this conclusion closely we see
that it does not contradict the traditional analysis.
In real terms, and disregarding the paper transactions
that evidence them . . . BDK's Generation I does
impair the capital of the economy. It does pass on
to Generation II a smaller amount of capital equip-
ment than would have been in existence if the
government expenditure had not been made. Generation
II makes good this impairment, right away, by
restricting its own consumption in the very year that
Generation I is enjoying its increment of consumption.
Generation II thereupon possesses the same stock of




The viex%rs and comments on the proceeding pages have
in general been complementary to the analysis of Buchanan
or Bowen-Davis-Kopf theses. As such they all have about
the same general approach to the subject in question.
There was, however, another protagonist in the argument
who had a somewhat different approach. This individual,
^5 Carl S. Shoup, "Debt Financing and Future
Generations," The Economic Journal, LXXII (December, 1962),
pp. 887-8.
^6 Ibid., pp. 890-1.
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Franco Modigliani, in the introduction of his paper
acknowledged the contributions of Buchanan and others,
but also noted that these most recent contributions
had failed.
... to provide an altogether adequate
framework - a failure resulting at least in part
from the Keynes ian tendency to emphasize flows
while paying inadequate attention to stocks. It
is the purpose of this paper to propose a fresh
approach to this problem, and to show that, unlike
its predecessors, it leads to a consistent and
yet straightforward answer to all relevant
questions .4-7
Modigliani then indicated the following approach:
... the central contention of our analysis is
that to grasp fully the economic effects of alter-
native fiscal policies and of the National Debt,
we must pay proper attention to stocks as well as
to the usual flow variables and to the long-run
as well as to the impact effects.lj.8
In stating that his paper would present a new
approach, Modigliani was certainly correct as far as
framework is concerned. He was to define National Debt
as, "all claims against/ the Government held bjr the
private sector of the economy, or by foreigners, whether
interest-bearing or not . . . and any claims held against
the private sector and foreigners, "^° a definition far
broader in scope than used in other analysis of the subject.
^ ^Franco Modigliani, "Long-Run Implications of
Alternative Fiscal Policies and the Burden of the National







Modigliani contended that the substantive
implications of his approach were: (1) deficit govern-
ment expenditure was advantageous to those individuals at
the time of the expenditure; (2) future generation would
bear a gross burden because of a reduction in the stock
of private capital, caused by the deficit expenditure;
(3) the reverse would also be true for a reduction in
national debt; ([}.) assuming that the interest rate at
which the government borrows is an approximation of the
marginal productivity of private capital, "the gross
burden for gain to future generations . . . can be
measured by the interest charges on the national debt";-3
(5>) contributions to future generations by the national
debt may be less than, equal to, or greater than the
burden.
Modigliani first attacked the basic hypothesis of
"new orthodoxy", i.e. the burden is borne by those
present at time of deficit, as follows:
The fallacy ... is not difficult to uncover.
It is quite true that a closed community cannot
increase its current resources by relying on
tomorrow's unproduced output. None the less, the way
in which we use today's resources can effect in three
major ways the output that will result tomorrow from
tomorrow's labour input; (i) by affecting the nation-
al resources available to the future; (ii) by improv-





ihe stock of man-made means of production, or
capital, available to future generations. Hence
government expenditure, and the way it is
financed, can affect the economy in the future
if it affects any of the above three items. 5l
His argument was:
... the demand of the private sector consists
of consumption C and capital formation I, and at
least the latter component depends not only on
income and taxes but also on monetary policy.
. . . in most circumstances • . . there will be
a range of values of T [[taxes] such that the
correspondinp^ r(T) £ the appropriate rate of interest,
r, for that particular value of T} is achievable by
an appropriate monetary policy. There is therefore
not one but a whole schedule of values of T which
are consistent with the maintenance of full employ-
ment and price stability, each value of T being
accomplished by an appropriate monetary policy.
Furthermore, x^ithin this range there will tend to
be a direct connection between T and the capital
formation component of P [[private sector demand
for output]. If, starting from a correct combin-
ation of T, r, and M (^quantity of money], we lower
taxes we will increase consumption, and to offset
this we must reduce capital formation by
appropriate monetary policy .... Thus, given the
level of government expenditure, the level of taxes,
and hence of budget deficit, does affect "future
generations" through the stock of capital inherited
by them. 52
Modigliani used the following analysis to support
the hypothesis of the "new heretics":
Suppose we take as a starting-point a given
G and some given combination of T and r consistent
with full employment. Suppose further, as is
generally assumed in Keynesian analysis, that to
a first approximation consumption responds to taxes
but not to interest rates. Now let the Government





increase its expenditure by dG x^rhile keeping taxes
constant. Then the deficit will increase
precisely by dD = dG. What will happen to capital
formation? If we are to maintain full employment
without inflation we must have
dG DG + DI =
and since, by assumption, taxes are constant and
hence dC = 0, we have
dG = dD = -dl
i.e. , the debt - financed expenditure must be
accompanied by an equal reduction in capital
formation (with the help of the appropriate
monetary policy)
.
The amount of resources available for, and
hence the level of private capital formation, is
cut down precisely by the amount of the deficit-
financed expenditure. It is also apparent that
this expenditure puts no burden on the "current"
members of the community. ... But because capital
formation has been cut by the amount of the deficit,
the community will thereafter dispose of a stock of
private capital curtailed to a corresponding extent.
Thus, the deficit-financed expenditure will
leave in its wake an overall burden on the economy
in the form of a reduced flow of income from the
reduced stock of private capital. 53
The latest exchange of papers on this subject was
initiated by E. J. Mishan of the London School of
Economics. trofessor Mishan admonished the protagonist of the
"new heretic" set for even writing on the subject because
of the adverse effects it might have on the uninformed.
As for the merit of the "new heretics" argument to date
Mishan stated:
My impression, for what it is irorth, is that
there is no evidence yet of any genuine class of
ideas. While there has been a repeated marshalling
of forces and some elaborate maneuvers executed by
the insurgents, they appear to have issued only in





being contended, nor Indeed were ever contended,
by the supporters of the new orthodoxy. 3U-
After briefly reviewing Buchanan's no-sacrif ice-
because-of-voluntary-purchase analysis, Mishan concluded:
The reader will surely apprehend that there is
nothing in this argument, if we provisionally accept
it, that contradicts anything held by the new
orthodoxy. It is still manifestly true that there
is no method of finance available to any government
enabling it to transfer real resources from the
future into the present. It is also true that the
government may have to redistribute some of the
community's future output as between taxpayer and
bondholder, and, as Buchanan reminds us, the tax-
payer will feel the oinch. 55
Mishan did not stop with Buchanan, but next pro-
ceeded into an examination of the Bowen-Davis-Kopf
analysis. Of Mishan' s comments on the BDK analysis the
following seem most significant:
... It is not the public debt per se that is
responsible for the Bowen-Davis-Kopf burden but the
wasteful expenditure that has left no legacy for the
future. £6
Mishan dismisses the paper of Modigliani abruptly
with the following comments:
. . .
apart from attributing to notions of net
worth the commonly accepted responses of taxpayers
to tax and debt finance, it adds little to what has
already been contended.
Modigliani finds the essence of the burden
argument in a proposition that can b e found lurking
in Buchanan's book, a proposition developed in
Musgrave's book, and one ascribed by Shoup to the
classical economists, in particular Ricardo; mainly
^Mishan, oo. cit
., p. 530.
^Ibid., pp. 532-3. ^ 6 Ibid., p. 537.
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that the burden of the public debt consists in the
loss of potential capital formation, and consequent
reduction of potential future income. 57
Mishan's paper was to elicit a number of heated
replies, the content of which, however, add nothing of
value to this study. The Mishan paper concludes the
examination of the various arguments and counter-arguments
both pro and con on the subject of placing of the burden
of public debt. The next apparent question, must be, what
does it all mean, if anything?
Before proceeding with the conclusion, let us first
review the discussion. The conservative economists defense
has been both repeated and consistent. Their arguments
have been: (1) the burden cannot be shifted onto future
generations because there is no way in which to transfer
real resources from the future to the present; (2) the
analysis must be on the level of the nation as a whole;
(3) since the "new heretics" have failed in every instance
to refute (1) , the liberals have no real argument with the
accepted doctrine.
The "new heretics" propositions have been divided
roughly into four schools of thought. Buchanan and Tullock
support the proposition, that since the bonds are purchased
voluntarily there can be no burden upon the purchaser;
therefore, the burden must rest with the taxpayer present
^ 7 lbid., p . 537.
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when the bonds are redeemed. The BDK analysis attributes
the burden to a reduction in lifetime consumption. The
Modigliani analysis attributes the burden to a reduction
in the stock of capital available to future generations.
In still another analysis, Miller attributes the burden
to an illusion which makes the taxpayer seem richer
than he actually is.
The "new heretics" have been consistent in thought
in only two areas. First, they unanimously agree that the
burden may be transferred or shifted onto a future genera-
tion. Secondly, their method of approach, while different
in content, is alike in the fact that they do not attempt
to disprove the doctrine of the "new orthodoxy", but only
deny its assumptions.
The general approach of the "nex^ heretics" has been
to set forth assumptions, make hypotheses, and then devise
an analogy which will support their hypothesis. Once
their hypo thesis is proven they assert that the doctrine
of the "new orthodoxy" must be inappropriate since their
proposition better serves the purpose of emphasizing the
burden of public debt.
Repeatedly throughout the literature, the conserv-
atives have contended that this is clearly a case of
semantics. One needs only to review a few of the different
models to ascertain the validity of this assertion. In
almost every one of the models burden of debt has either
32

a different implied or defined meaning. For example, BDK
begin their argument by acknowledging the validity of the
accepted doctrine and then state that they are able to
come to a different conclusion if they redefine burden.
Hansen implies that real sacrifice or burden is the result
of harder work and restricted consumption. Modigliani
attributed the burden to a reduction in the future stock
of capital.
The burden, as defined by the conservatives, seems to
be quite vague and impersonal. However, there also existed
just as much doubt in the various definitions of the liber-
als. In each of the arguments of the liberals there seems
to be the implicit assumption that any government expendi-
ture is wasteful. In any case, if the argument did acknow-
ledge that the government expenditure could be productive
it was then contended that the greater the productivity
the smaller the burden. Another significant area of concern
arose over the argument of the macro versus micro analysis.
The "new orthodoxy" has chosen to minimize the implications
of the limited capabilities of macroeconomics. Macroeconomics
is the study of the aggregates of the economy, a study which
is framed by a limited number of measurable variables. In
such an analysis it is impossible to measure the multitude
of effects that the public debt may impose upon the
individuals of society. Therefore, if the aim is to measure
the burden of debt upon the individual members of society -
33

and if the assumption cannot be made that the burden
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